Turkey and Iran’s Nuclear Conundrum: Much Ado about Nothing?

Ushering in a new era in Turkish-Iranian relations has been a facet of an overall reorientation of Turkish foreign policy. Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) the Middle East has gained more weight and become a key region for Turkish diplomacy. This was in line with the new strategic doctrine introduced by Ahmet Davutoglu, the chief foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan who in May 2009 rose to the post of Foreign Minister.
According to Davutoglu’s vision, Turkey is a “central power” and possesses “strategic depth.”  This means that Turkey should no more shape its regional strategies and policies in accordance with the strategic priorities of its Western allies, most importantly the United States. On the contrary, it had to establish its own strategic agenda and priorities, which would not necessarily coincide with these of the United States or Europe. In Davutoglu’s view, Turkey had to dissociate itself from its established militaristic and firmly pro-Western image and foster a new image in which Turkey’s soft power, translated into economic, cultural and political clout would prevail. According to that view, Turkey should claim a leading intermediary role in all regional conflicts in the Middle East, resolve all pending bilateral disputes and build strategic cooperation with its neighbors. This allowed for a reconfiguration of Turkey’s relations with Iran, which should not be a function –or even hostage– of US- or European-Iranian relations. In a recent article, Davutoglu stated that


....our allies should take into consideration Turkey’s unique position. As a growing economy and surrounded by energy resources, Turkey needs Iranian energy as a natural extension of its national interests. Therefore, Turkey’s energy agreements with Iran cannot be dependent upon its relationships with other countries.

Turkey’s new Iran policy has comprised a clear attempt to achieve its emancipation from US Middle Eastern policy.  Ever since the rise of AKP into power in 2002, Turkey has increasingly taken distance from US strategies and policies in Iraq, Israel and other Middle Eastern states. It is also indicative that Davutoglu in his writings includes Iran to his privileged group of states which due to their history and geography have a “central power” status and enjoy “strategic depth.” Hence he prioritizes the development of strong Turkish-Iranian strategic relations. Iran and its energy resources are more important for Turkey than its Western allies might consider.
Energy has been an area where Turkish-Iranian cooperation has flourished. The cooperation, which had begun in the mid 1990s through the construction of a pipeline for the export of Iranian natural gas to Turkey has been consolidated and included Turkish investment in the Iranian natural gas upstream sector. According to a 2008 Memorandum of Understanding Turkey’s TPAO would participate in the development of South Pars, Iran’s largest offshore natural gas field. Bilateral trade reached 10 billion dollars in 2008, with the aim to reach 20 billion by 2013. Yet there was much more than mutual economic gains in Turkish-Iranian relations. A series of official visits highlighted the level of mutual understanding at the top level, and public opinion of both countries seemed to agree. During his official visit to Turkey in August 2007, Iran’s President Mahmud Ahmadinejad was cheered by Turkish citizens when he went to pray in the historic Sultanahmet mosque in Istanbul. This was all the more important given Iran’s increasing alienation at the international level. The Iranian nuclear program has caused fear and concern about the true intentions of the Iranian regime. Iran’s potential interest in developing nuclear weapons has worried not only the United States, Israel and Europe, but also Arab states, most notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
Many suspect religion to be one of the main reasons for the affinity between Ankara and Tehran. The AKP, Turkey’s government party since 2002 comes from the ranks of Turkish political Islam, and this was perceived to be sufficient reason for a close relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Religious affinity was indeed the reason why Turkey’s first Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan aimed to improve bilateral relations and signed the first natural gas deal with Iran in 1996. Nevertheless, it was rather pragmatism and not religion behind the determination of the AKP government to upgrade relations with Iran and claim a key role in its nuclear controversy. The Iranian nuclear crisis provided a golden opportunity –as well as a litmus test– for Foreign Minister Davutoglu to implement his vision about Turkey’s proactive foreign policy and autonomous strategic role. Distancing itself from the United States and the European Union, Turkey claimed a leading mediating role in the Iranian nuclear dispute. It has refused to side with Western pressure aiming to stop Iran’s uranium enrichment program, objected to the imposition of any sanctions against Tehran and defended Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In accordance to this vision, Turkey has aimed to spearhead international mediation for a compromise solution. In his visit to Tehran in February 2010, Davutoglu attempted to broker a deal for the enrichment of uranium necessary for Iranian nuclear power plants under conditions which would preclude the possibility of developing nuclear weapon capabilities. Turkey’s interventions aimed further than minimizing the risk of developing nuclear fuel for Iranian power plants. In a speech in Washington DC in December 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan defended a nuclear-free Middle East and accused the Western states of double standards when dealing with issues of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. This was a skilful implication of Israel, a country which is not a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but is believed to possess nuclear weapons, in Iran’s nuclear controversy. Turkey attempted to reshape the agenda of nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East in a way that did not only include Iran but also Israel.
This was not the first time Turkey attempted to antagonize Israel on a regional security issue. In his famous Davos duel with Israeli President Shimon Peres in January 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan chastised Israel’s policies in Gaza, winning strong applause throughout the Islamic world. Turkish-Israeli relations reached a lowmark on 31 May 2010, when nine Turkish activists were killed during clashes between a flotilla aiming to break the Israeli blockade and bring humanitarian aid to Gaza and Israeli security forces. This escalation seriously undermined an alliance which used to be one of the cornerstones of Turkey’s security policy and affected Turkey’s relations with the pro-Israel lobby in the United States. On the other hand, it allowed Turkey to claim a leadership role among the Islamic world. Erdogan voiced popular arguments throughout the Middle East regarding the Palestinian question and Iran’s nuclear program, namely that it would be unfair to demand from Iran to freeze its nuclear program, while Israel has faced no criticism for its violation of nuclear proliferation treaties and development of nuclear weapons. The popularity of Prime Minister Erdogan reached high peaks in the Islamic world. Nowadays, he may indeed be more popular in several Arab capitals than in Ankara.
While the Iranian nuclear crisis allows for the articulation of Turkey’s regional leadership and autonomous strategic planning ambitions, one begs the question whether it has had any real impact on the crisis itself. The jury is still out on this. Several experts point at the widening of diplomatic maneuvering space which Turkey’s diplomatic activism has secured. It would be hard to deny the significance of building dialogue and communication channels between the Iranian regime and the West, especially as far as the prevention of sanctions and further escalation are concerned. On the other hand, the deal which Turkey and Brazil clinched with Iran on 17 May 2010 bore little fruit, as far as the crux of the crisis is concerned. Failing to win Iran’s abolition of its domestic uranium enrichment program meant that the international community would not consider the agreement satisfactory. The 10 June 2010 decision of the UN Security Council to impose additional sanctions on Iran due to its nuclear program was a consequence of this and was made despite the dissenting votes of Turkey and Brazil. This had two lessons for Turkish diplomacy. First, to be an efficient mediator, Turkey needed to maintain close working relations with the West. Second, Iran did not perceive Turkey to be its sole intermediary with the West. In other words, Turkey’s role in the resolution of the Iranian nuclear question was not considered indispensable by Iran.
One also needs to add that Turkey’s Iran strategy entails considerable risk, as far as the regional implications from the potential rise of Iran as a nuclear power are concerned. In fact, Turkey would be one of the countries whose security could be worst impaired if Iran reneged on its commitments and developed its own nuclear weapons. Turkey might even have to join a nuclear arms race with other Middle Eastern states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt with the aim to counter Iran’s regional leadership claims. By trusting the good intentions of Iran’s leadership and overestimating its leverage over it, Turkey may be taking a big risk.
    To sum up, Turkey’s attempt to claim a mediating role between Iran and the West on Iran’s nuclear program has so far produced few tangible results. The problem persists, and no final solution has been achieved on the question of safely enriching Iran’s uranium for peaceful purposes. It has, however, underlined the emancipation of Turkey’s strategic planning and foreign policy, as well as its ambition for a leading role in the Middle East. Turkey’s regional interests have become too important to be compromised by US, European or Israeli concerns regarding Iran and its nuclear ambitions. The endgame of the Iranian nuclear conundrum will provide evidence on whether this reconfiguration was rational or a case of strategic overstretch.

Bibliography

Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu (İstanbul: Küre, 2005)
———, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, no. 1 (2008), pp. 77-96
International Crisis Group (ICG), Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints [Europe Report No 203] (Brussels, 2010)
Heinz Kramer, AKP's 'New' Foreign Policy between Vision and Pragmatism [Working Paper FG 2] (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2010)

(Published in Arabic in the magazine "Afaq-al-Mustaqbal" in September 2010)