Turkey’s Kurdish Question: Glimmers of Hope?

While never really off the agenda of Turkish politics, the Kurdish question has been attracting increasing attention in recent weeks. The municipal elections of 31 March signalled a triumphant comeback for the party of the Kurdish minority, the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi-DTP). In the 2007 parliamentary elections Turkey's government party the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) was able to make big inroads among the Kurdish voters of southeastern Turkey and challenge the regional electoral hegemony of the DTP. Following these results, some speculated that the AKP would be even able to claim from the DTP even the municipality of Diyarbakir, the biggest city in southeastern Turkey and stronghold of the Kurdish nationalist movement. They proved very wrong. The DTP candidate and incumbent mayor of Diyarbakir was re-elected with a stunning 65.6 percent of the vote, while the AKP lost the biggest part of the votes it won in the region in the 2007 elections. Turkey's Kurds showed their disillusionment with the AKP policy on the Kurdish question. Many columnists argued that this was a serious warning signal towards the Turkish government. Failure to deliver on long-standing issues related to the Kurdish minority would lead its radicalisation to the detriment of Turkey's social and political stability.

While the need for a new Kurdish policy was discussed, a major intervention came from the mountains of Northern Iraq. Hasan Cemal, one of Turkey's most distinguished journalists, visited the headquarters of the Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan-PKK) in Kandil Mountain to interview Murat Karayilan, the PKK's military leader. In his long interview, published in several sequels in the Milliyet daily, Karayilan attempted to convey a conciliatory message. He argued that the Kurdish issue had again reached a critical point like in 1993 and that Turkey could never militarily defeat the PKK. Karayilan added that the PKK had changed and pursued the promotion of Kurdish rights in Turkey without disrupting the unitary structure of the Turkish state and declared his readiness for armistice and dialogue with Turkey. Turkey's interlocutor could be PKK's imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan or the current leadership of the PKK, or the DTP or even "a committee of wise people" trusted by both sides. Karayilan came to the point of expressing his sorrow for a recent series of PKK mine attacks in southeastern Turkey which cost the lives of Turkish soldiers in violation of a self-declared armistice. He argued that these attacks were not decided by him but were initiatives of local warlords. Karayilan even intervened in Turkey's secularist debate, arguing that the PKK acted as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism in southeastern Turkey. PKK's demise would mean the domination of militant Islam in the region. He also warned against the activities of Islamic brotherhoods (tarikats), mentioning in particular the Fethullah Gulen movement. Regarding the Kurdish question, Karayilan stressed that the solution he envisioned did not necessarily entail a federation, but more local autonomy in accordance with a reform of the local authorities' law. He even argued that many Turkish generals have moderated their views on the Kurdish issue. It was rather some politicians who failed to lead the process for a resolution of the conflict. Karayilan explicitly referred to Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan whose landmark statements in 2005 regarding the resolution of the Kurdish question through Turkey's democratisation remained an empty letter.

Equally interesting was the reaction of Turkey's former Chief of General Staff. Yasar Buyukanit, in his first interview following his retirement last year, was asked to comment on Karayilan's interview. Buyukanit responded that the PKK should be judged on the basis of its deeds, not words. He added that the PKK would not disarm unless three conditions were met: a general amnesty, constitutional protection of Kurdish identity and education rights. He admitted that even if the whole Turkish army was sent to occupy the Kandil Mountain camp, this would not mean the end of the PKK. These statements created a second shock, maybe bigger than. The spokesman of the Turkish Armed Forces was quick in stating that these statements were personal and did not reflect the official views of the Turkish army.

Both interviews reasonably attracted the careful attention of policy makers, columnists and the public opinion. For the first time in many years, a PKK leader appeared ready to negotiate an armistice or even a withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkish territory without the fulfilment of PKK conditions. At the same time, a general who used to lead Turkish armed forces until a year ago admitted that there could be no military solution to the PKK question and appeared condescending towards a negotiation with the PKK leadership. Meanwhile, similar messages were coming from the Turkish government. Reversing administrative decisions which had changed Kurdish toponyms with Turkish ones in eastern and southeastern Turkey, easing restrictions to the public use of Kurdish and the broadcast of Kurdish language media and promoting Kurdish language education were discussed as possible measures in that direction. Turkey's President Abdullah Gul who stated that "the Kurdish question is Turkey's biggest problem" was expected to take a lead role in this initiative.

The coincidence of all these interviews and statements reinforced the speculation that a serious diplomatic initiative led by the United States and the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq had born some fruit. The US need to stabilise Iraq before the departure of its forces necessitated improving relations between Iraqi Kurds and Turkey. The PKK appeared for the first time willing to give up its armed struggle without the transformation of Turkey into a federation. What remains to be seen is whether the AKP government would be willing to deliver its old promises: Full protection of Kurdish minority rights, which were hit by the deceleration of the overall reform process in Turkey since 2004 and even –maybe– a general amnesty. One can also only hope that the Turkish Constitutional Court will not ban the DTP in its upcoming verdict. Bridging the gap between the state and Turkey's Kurds will be a long and tedious process. While such measures would definitely meet with the ire of Turkish nationalists and opposition parties, it is hard to imagine alternative ways to resolve the conflict. If even generals admit the impossibility of a military solution, civilians should listen.

(Published on Athens News on 22 May 2009)