In his first visit of Europe and the Middle East, US President Barack Obama attempted in several occasions to clearly distinguish himself from the policies of his predecessor George W Bush. His attempts to transcend the “Old Europe-New Europe” jargon and give a new meaning to the transatlantic partnership were evident. Yet there was a one issue where Obama’s position was identical to his predecessor’s: Turkey’s membership of the European Union. Addressing EU leaders in Prague, Obama said that “the United States and Europe must approach Muslims as our friends, neighbours and partners in fighting injustice, intolerance and violence, forging a relationship based on mutual respect and mutual interests….Moving forward towards Turkish membership in the EU would be an important signal of your (EU) commitment to this agenda and ensure that we continue to anchor Turkey firmly in Europe.”
Obama’s may still enjoy unprecedented popularity ratings in Europe, yet his full support for Turkey’s EU membership met with immediate reaction. Some European political leaders saw his statement as an unnecessary intervention in a bilateral affair. The strongest opponent of Turkey’s EU membership, French president Nicolas Sarkozy, responded that the decision of Turkey’s entry to the European Union belonged to EU member states and reiterated his clear opposition to full membership. He added: “I have always been opposed to this entry. I still am and I think I can say that the immense majority of member states shares the position of France….Turkey is a very great country, an ally of Europe, an ally of the United States. It will stay a privileged partner. My position hasn’t changed and it won’t change.” Sarkozy’s opposition to the was soon matched by that of his Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner whose personal opinion used to be in favour of Turkey’s EU bid. Kouchner stated that Turkey’s initial opposition to the candidacy of Danish Prime Minster Anders Fogh Rasmussen for the NATO General Secretary post turned him against its EU membership.
The wisdom of persistent US interventions in EU-Turkey relations has long been debated. A recent Economist article called Obama’s support for Turkey as a “tactical mistake.” This was even more the case when his predecessor, one of the least popular US Presidents abroad, was lobbying for the improvement of EU-Turkey relations. Many commentators argued then that Bush’ support was not helping Turkey; in fact, it even backfired, raising suspicion among some Europeans about the true motives of US support for Turkey’s EU membership. Some of them explained strong US support as an attempt to establish a US “Trojan Horse” within the European Union. They have feared that the main reason for this was the US plan to forestall the transformation of the European Union into a strong global actor, able to compete with competitor. In that view, Turkey’s EU membership would derail any attempts for forging a strong European identity, as well as a common foreign and security policy. The validity of this argument was questioned following the rapid deterioration of US-Turkey relations. The refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow the use of Turkish territory by US military forces during the 2003 Iraq war showed that US and Turkey regional strategic interests would not necessarily always coincide. Bilateral relations cooled off, and elements of anti-Americanism became for the first time visible in Turkish public opinion. This meant that Turkey would no more simply follow US strategic and policy choices, as during the Cold War. On the European side, a series of political crises and the failure to ratify treaties aiming to bring about long-needed institutional reform showed that Turkey’s potential membership would not comprise the main reason for Europe’s political or diplomatic weakness. Turkey’s candidacy did not cause European discord and institutional inertia. It simply brought existing issues to the fore.
Leaving the wisdom of persistent US interventions aside, one needs to also consider the sagacity of European vacillations. Sarkozy’s statements about the right of the European Union to decide on Turkey’s EU membership conveniently ignore the fact that the issue of Turkey’s European vocation is not new. The European Union has already discussed this question and answered it on the affirmative, at least in two major occasions. The first was the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, when Turkey following years of diplomatic turmoil was awarded the status of candidate state for EU membership. The second occasion was the Brussels European Council of December 2004, which decided to endorse the start of accession negotiations between the European Union and Turkey. This means that the question to be answered at this point is not “if” but “when” and “under what conditions” Turkey will become a member of the European Union. Accession negotiations have been proceeding slowly, and there are several reasons for this. The lack of any progress in the Cyprus issue, as well as the firm opposition of the Sarkozy government to Turkey’s full membership, has shed a long shadow on the negotiations. Several chapters have been blocked by the governments of Cyprus and France. In addition, the slowdown of the reform process in Turkey since 2005 has also crucially hampered the process.
EU leaders and the European Commission should demand from Turkey the acceleration of pending reforms, which can entail a new, civil, liberal constitution, full protection of political freedoms, religious and minority rights. Yet one cannot open again the question of whether Turkey is a European country or whether full membership should be the aim of negotiations without undermining the credibility of the European Union among prospective members, neighbours and at a global level. Just as in the case of Central and East European countries, Turkey has to be given a fair membership chance, conditional upon full compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria and adoption of the acquis communautaire. Any deviation from this position would severely harm Europe’s global ambitions, exactly at the time Turkey’s image in the Muslim world has enjoyed a sharp rise. Turkey’s EU membership may after all be good for Europe and the world, even though GW Bush has supported it.
(Published on Athens News on 17 April 2009)
Obama’s may still enjoy unprecedented popularity ratings in Europe, yet his full support for Turkey’s EU membership met with immediate reaction. Some European political leaders saw his statement as an unnecessary intervention in a bilateral affair. The strongest opponent of Turkey’s EU membership, French president Nicolas Sarkozy, responded that the decision of Turkey’s entry to the European Union belonged to EU member states and reiterated his clear opposition to full membership. He added: “I have always been opposed to this entry. I still am and I think I can say that the immense majority of member states shares the position of France….Turkey is a very great country, an ally of Europe, an ally of the United States. It will stay a privileged partner. My position hasn’t changed and it won’t change.” Sarkozy’s opposition to the was soon matched by that of his Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner whose personal opinion used to be in favour of Turkey’s EU bid. Kouchner stated that Turkey’s initial opposition to the candidacy of Danish Prime Minster Anders Fogh Rasmussen for the NATO General Secretary post turned him against its EU membership.
The wisdom of persistent US interventions in EU-Turkey relations has long been debated. A recent Economist article called Obama’s support for Turkey as a “tactical mistake.” This was even more the case when his predecessor, one of the least popular US Presidents abroad, was lobbying for the improvement of EU-Turkey relations. Many commentators argued then that Bush’ support was not helping Turkey; in fact, it even backfired, raising suspicion among some Europeans about the true motives of US support for Turkey’s EU membership. Some of them explained strong US support as an attempt to establish a US “Trojan Horse” within the European Union. They have feared that the main reason for this was the US plan to forestall the transformation of the European Union into a strong global actor, able to compete with competitor. In that view, Turkey’s EU membership would derail any attempts for forging a strong European identity, as well as a common foreign and security policy. The validity of this argument was questioned following the rapid deterioration of US-Turkey relations. The refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow the use of Turkish territory by US military forces during the 2003 Iraq war showed that US and Turkey regional strategic interests would not necessarily always coincide. Bilateral relations cooled off, and elements of anti-Americanism became for the first time visible in Turkish public opinion. This meant that Turkey would no more simply follow US strategic and policy choices, as during the Cold War. On the European side, a series of political crises and the failure to ratify treaties aiming to bring about long-needed institutional reform showed that Turkey’s potential membership would not comprise the main reason for Europe’s political or diplomatic weakness. Turkey’s candidacy did not cause European discord and institutional inertia. It simply brought existing issues to the fore.
Leaving the wisdom of persistent US interventions aside, one needs to also consider the sagacity of European vacillations. Sarkozy’s statements about the right of the European Union to decide on Turkey’s EU membership conveniently ignore the fact that the issue of Turkey’s European vocation is not new. The European Union has already discussed this question and answered it on the affirmative, at least in two major occasions. The first was the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, when Turkey following years of diplomatic turmoil was awarded the status of candidate state for EU membership. The second occasion was the Brussels European Council of December 2004, which decided to endorse the start of accession negotiations between the European Union and Turkey. This means that the question to be answered at this point is not “if” but “when” and “under what conditions” Turkey will become a member of the European Union. Accession negotiations have been proceeding slowly, and there are several reasons for this. The lack of any progress in the Cyprus issue, as well as the firm opposition of the Sarkozy government to Turkey’s full membership, has shed a long shadow on the negotiations. Several chapters have been blocked by the governments of Cyprus and France. In addition, the slowdown of the reform process in Turkey since 2005 has also crucially hampered the process.
EU leaders and the European Commission should demand from Turkey the acceleration of pending reforms, which can entail a new, civil, liberal constitution, full protection of political freedoms, religious and minority rights. Yet one cannot open again the question of whether Turkey is a European country or whether full membership should be the aim of negotiations without undermining the credibility of the European Union among prospective members, neighbours and at a global level. Just as in the case of Central and East European countries, Turkey has to be given a fair membership chance, conditional upon full compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria and adoption of the acquis communautaire. Any deviation from this position would severely harm Europe’s global ambitions, exactly at the time Turkey’s image in the Muslim world has enjoyed a sharp rise. Turkey’s EU membership may after all be good for Europe and the world, even though GW Bush has supported it.
(Published on Athens News on 17 April 2009)
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