The New Cyprus Negotiations and the Turkish Military

After a period of relative obscurity, the Cyprus question has come back to the press headlines. More than four years after the Annan plan referenda, the most serious attempt to reach a solution to the long standing island's dispute is under way. The two leaders of the island's communities, Dimitris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat started regular meetings on 3 September 2008 with the aim to achieve what has proved impossible in almost fifty years of negotiations. There is an aura of optimism: The two leaders have maintained very good personal relations for years and are known as "moderates" in their respective communities when it comes to the Cyprus question. Yet the beginning of the negotiations was marred by an incident indicative of the obstacles to be faced in the future.

Following the opening of the Ledra Palace checkpoint in Nicosia in April 2003, several other checkpoints were opened throughout the Green Line straddling across the divided island. They meant to facilitate communication, a basic condition for the improvement of strained relations between two communities, which have lived in virtual separation for more than forty years. No checkpoint was opened, however, in the divided Tylliria region in north-western Cyprus. This meant hardship for local Greek and Turkish Cypriot refugees who had to travel for many kilometres to Nicosia in order to visit their villages just a few kilometres on the other side of the Green Line. The opening of the checkpoint near the occupied village of Limnitis (Yesilirmak) was suggested as a solution. Negotiations followed suit, and an agreement was finally reached for a tentative opening of the checkpoint. Turkish Cypriots would cross through Limnitis on 8 August 2008 to visit the today deserted Turkish Cypriot exclave of Kokkina (Erenkoy) on the anniversary of the fierce bicommunal battles which took place there in 1964. Greek Cypriots would cross on 2 September to visit Morphou (Guzelyurt) and attend a mass at the town's St. Mamas Cathedral. While the first leg of the agreement was realised, the second was not. Shortly before 2 September, the Turkish military forces rejected the Greek Cypriot crossing on "security reasons." This move gave a clear signal about the role which the Turkish military continued to claim in the Cyprus issue, as well as the real limits to the powers of Talat that it posed.

To better understand the position of the Turkish military on the Cyprus question, one needs to keep in mind the key significance of the Cyprus question for Turkish domestic politics. With the exception of Turkey's participation in the UN force in Korea, the Cyprus invasion was the first overseas military operation in the history of republican Turkey. The victory of summer 1974 reinforced the prestige of the Turkish military and legitimised its intervention into Turkish domestic politics. It is ironic that Turkey's military victory in summer 1974 ended up as one of the biggest obstacles to the consolidation of Turkish democracy. On the other hand, Greece's military defeat had the opposite effect. The military defeat brought about the fall of the Greek junta as well as the wiping out of all the vestiges of the Greek post-war "deep state," which were active in both the Greek 1967 coup and the Cypriot 1974 coup.

Gradually a redefinition of the grounds for Turkey's military presence on the island took place. Turkey's presence was not simply linked to the protection of the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community. It was rather projected as a "vital issue for Turkish national security." Cyprus was seen as a key ring in Turkey's imagined axis of enemy neighbours ranging from cold-war Bulgaria to Greece, Syria and the Soviet Union. Through this process of securitisation, the Cyprus question joined the Kurdish and secularism questions as an instrument for the promotion of the military's tutelary role in Turkish politics. The perpetuation of the conflict ended up much more favourable for the military's interests than any compromise solution. This also helps explain the gradual hardening of the Turkish position. The proclamation of the independence of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in 1983 underlined that Turkey was not interested in a negotiated solution on the island. According to the adage of these days, "the lack of a solution is the solution." Both Turkish Cypriots and Turkish democracy became hostages to a status quo which mainly served the domestic interests of the Turkish military elite. The exorbitant price which Turkish Cypriots paid through their international isolation was considered negligible. So was the cost for Turkey's EU membership aspirations. Turkey's increasing international isolation was in fact serving the interests of the military on the domestic level. Accusing the European Union of trying to compromise Turkish strategic interests in Cyprus was easier than objecting to the demise of the military's tutelage over the political system, an essential part of any Turkish democratisation programme.

This position was questioned for the first time with the rise of the AKP government into power in November 2002. Mounting reaction by Turkish Cypriot citizens against the Denktas regime, the resolve of the AKP government to remove obstacles to Turkey's EU accession and the tacit support of the then Chief of General Staff Hilmi Ozkok made possible a new, less "securitised" reading of the Cyprus issue. These allowed Turkey's support for the Annan Plan in 2004. It is questionable whether all the conditions which enabled this policy shift in 2004 exist today. While recent domestic developments in Turkey have strengthened the position of Erdogan, this does not mean that he could again easily bear the brunt of supporting a compromise solution in Cyprus, especially when the prospect of Turkey's EU membership looks rather vague. A new consent by the military similar to the one given in 2004 is not a given; on the contrary, the military could pose obstacles to the negotiations. This does not mean that negotiations are doomed to fail. It does mean though that even stronger political resolve may be necessary in the months to follow.

(Published on Athens News on 26 September 2008)