Let us state the obvious from the beginning. On 30 July 2008, Turkey escaped a major political and economic crisis that could have lead to the escalation of serious social cleavage. The proposal of Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya to close Turkey’s incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) failed to garner the support of the qualified majority of seven of the 11 Constitutional Court judges necessary for such a decision. It convinced only six. Thanks to one vote, AKP escaped closure, and the supporters of Turkey’s democratisation, inside and outside the country, sighed with relief.
Yet, this AKP victory could be considered as pyrrhic. Yes, the party escaped closure and having 71 of its leading figures banned from politics. Although contingency plans had already been drafted - including the formation of a new party and the “takeover” of an existing small political party with the en-masse accession of the party MPs - all of them could have met with additional judicial or administrative obstacles.
On the other hand, the Constitutional Court's verdict did not acquit AKP. In fact, it was the only one of Yalcinkaya's proposals that failed to attract the qualified seven-vote majority. Ten of the 11 members of the Constitutional Court agreed with the chief prosecutor's allegation that AKP had become a “focal point of anti-secular activities”. Six sided with the prosecutor on his sentence proposal, voting for the party's closure. However, four judges voted for the party to be issued a warning and fined an amount equal to 50 percent of the annual state subsidy, approximately 13 million Euros.
As the full text of the decision has not been released yet, one can speculate that the court considered AKP's initiatives to lift some administrative barriers on the country’s Muslims as evidence of its anti-secular activity. These initiatives could include the 2004 attempt to lift restrictions graduates of religious vocational high schools face when trying to enter higher education institutions, as well as the recent amendment of the constitution that would allow for headscarves to be worn in universities. Such an argument would mean that the court took a strongly illiberal position on the issue of secularism, which has become the heart of the conflict between AKP and the leading opposition, Republican People’s Party (
The court apparently reconfirmed its aloofness to all discussions about the need to develop a more tolerant version of secularism that would respect individual autonomy and freedom of choice and establish a neutral state attitude towards religion. Such a signal was already given with the court’s decision in June to annul the constitutional amendment aimed at easing headscarf restrictions because of its “opposition to the constitutional principle of secularism".
Despite the refusal to close the party, a Damocles sword is hanging over AKP. This uneasiness was expressed last week when rumours about the possible launch of a second case against AKP spread in Ankara and immediately affected the financial markets. It was speculated that the chief prosecutor would launch a second case, more limited this time, aimed at banning from politics the AKP members who had turned it into a “focal point of anti-secular activities". Such a conclusion could emanate from the fact that the court decision accepted the allegation of the indictment that the party had indeed become such a point. (last sent wordy and unclear, rewrite) It is questionable, though, whether a second case would enjoy even the limited social support which the first case did..
The crisis in the relations between
The existence of these divisions facilitates any AKP attempts to reach a rapprochement with the moderate part of the secularist camp. Failing to make any progress on issues such as freedom of expression and Alevi and non-Muslim minority rights, as well as focusing exclusively on the headscarf issue helped raise suspicion about the party's commitment to the democratisation reform. This commitment can be best signalled through the acceleration of the reform process and renewed interest in the EU accession negotiations. This reform would necessarily include a major constitutional amendment, if not the promulgation of a new constitution.
A new constitution would allow AKP to eliminate any suspicions that it intends to gradually achieve the Islamisation of the society and apply discriminatory measures against the secularists. By improving the constitutional protection of all fundamental human rights and freedoms, the AKP would signal to moderate secularists its determination to widen the space of individual autonomy for all and not only its pious voters.
Having convinced the moderate secularists about these intentions through the content of the constitutional reform, the AKP will be able not only to promote the religious freedom of Sunni Muslims but also to limit the ability of the judiciary to intervene in politics by annulling constitutional amendments and banning political parties on dubious legal grounds and factual evidence. In addition to alleviating social divides in Turkey, these steps would help rejuvenate Turkey’s faltering EU accession process.
In the aftermath of the court decision, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan pledged his determination to lead Turkey to full EU membership. He did the same after the triumph of his party, almost a year ago on 22 July 2007, with meagre results.
The court decision marked the end of a lost year for Turkey’s political reform and social conciliation. It is up to AKP to seize the opportunity now emerging and restore the parliament as the hub of political reform. There is no time or grace period left.
Dr Ioannis N Grigoriadis is a Lecturer at the Department of Turkish & Modern Asian Studies, University of Athens and a Research Fellow at ELIAMEP
(Published on Athens News on 15 August 2008)
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