Turkish Politics in 2012: The Beginning of Transition in the AKP?

It is hard to overstate the hype that Turkish economic performance has caused among policy analysts and financiers since the peak of the financial crisis. Turkey has been among the countries which bounced most sharply following the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers and the global economic meltdown. While recent economic indicators may point that the Turkish economic “miracle” may be reaching its end, political risks may further add to uncertainty. The political future of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan lies at the heart of these deliberations. Until recently Erdoğan’s move to the Presidential Palace was a widely debated issue due to his statement that he would not run for Prime Minister again and his intentions to inject elements of “presidentialism” into Turkey’s parliamentary system. A constitutional amendment empowering the President according to the French model appeared to appeal to the Turkish Prime Minister. While the parliamentary seat distribution following the 2011 elections did not help his constitutional amendment plans, the news about his disease has introduced an additional and unexpected element of uncertainty. While Erdoğan has attempted to reassure party members and the public about his health, the already preexisting debate about his succession has inevitably been rekindled.

Turkey’s New Middle East Policy and Greece

George Papandreou’s recent visit to the Middle East was a long-awaited and welcome move. After many years and despite current economic hardships, Greece has manifested its interest in reclaiming a role in a crucial region where it used to enjoy strong political and economic ties. But is this the beginning of a new foreign policy, or simply an act of opportunism as Turkey’s Middle East policy shifts against Israel?
Turkey’s strong involvement in Middle Eastern affairs dates to the rise of the AKP government in 2002 and is linked with the name of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. According to Davutoglu’s strategic vision, Turkey due to its history and geography possesses “strategic depth,” has multiple regional identities and belongs to the group of “central powers”; in other words, it has been poised to undertake a special role in world history and politics. In a nutshell, Davutoglu suggests that Turkey needs to cease to play the role of the bridge of the client state of the West and develop a strategic vision of its own.
Despite all the hype about Davutoglu’s “strategic doctrine,” it is true that much of what he proposed is not really new. Visions about Turkey’s multi-faceted, multi-polar foreign policy were coined by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in the late 1980s and Foreign Minister Ismail Cem in the late 1990s. What Davutoglu did was to add two significant conditions for Turkey to realise its full potential in the region. Turkey needed to resolve its two most pressing domestic problems, the Kurdish issue and the debate over  the role of Islam in the public sphere. Turkey also needed to overcome all pending bilateral disputes through a “zero problem policy” with its neighbours.
Syria, Turkey’s arch-enemy in the Middle East, had maintained territorial claims on the province of Alexandretta. It objected to Turkey’s construction of dams  that limited the flow of the river Euphrates into Syria. Thus, Syria was until the late 1990s one of the main sponsors of the PKK activity in southeast Turkey and even sheltered its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. A decade later, Turkish-Syrian economic relations are booming, and relations at the political level are better than ever. A free trade agreement has been in operation since 2007, and minister-level Council of Strategic Cooperation to promote cooperation.
Iraq was another difficult area. Turkey’s unease with the prospect of Kurdish autonomy in the north was no secret. Turkey opposed the second Gulf War precisely because it feared a breakup of Iraq. Turkish Parliament famously refused the use of Turkish territory to US troops on the eve of the Iraq invasion, and consequently Turkish troops did not play a major role in post-war Iraqi security.. Yet the AKP government was quick to develop a working relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraqi Kurdish political parties. It developed strong relations with both major Iraqi Kurdish political actors, the President of Iraq Jalal Talabani and the President of the KRG Massoud Barzani. Economic relations were boosted.
Relations with Israel stood in stark contrast to these improvements. Ever since the AKP invited Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal to Ankara for talks in February 2006, Turkish-Israeli relations have been undergoing a slow but steady deterioration. Rare outbursts against Israel took place, sometimes in the limelight of international events. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly upbraided  Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum summit in Davos in January 2009. Turkish Ambassador to Israel Oguz Celikkol was publicly humiliated a year later by Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon. The low point came on May 31, when a humanitarian aid flotilla attempted to break an Israeli naval blockade of Gaza. Israeli troops intercepted it, killing nine Turkish activists.
The severe worsening of Turkish-Israeli relations has cast doubt on Turkey’s ability to promote peace and reconciliation in the Middle East. By taking such a clear pro-Palestinian –or rather pro-Hamas– stance, Turkey was wasting its ability to act as a neutral mediator, as far as Israel was concerned. Moreover, Davutoglu’s statement that the Gaza attack was psychologically like 9/11 for Turkey and his statement to a group of seventeen Arab Foreign Ministers that “Jerusalem will soon be the capital of Palestine and we will go and pray in the Al-Aqsa Mosque all together,” surprised many of those observers who considered him to be a cool-headed and shrewd strategist.
Turkey might face additional consequences due to its new Middle East policy on a different front. The Israeli lobby has traditionally lent a hand of support to Turkey whenever a key decision or vote were to made in Washington DC on issues considered key to Turkish interests. This support may well evaporate now given the new circumstances, and Turkey may encounter some nasty surprises in forthcoming votes in the US Congress.
Some argue that Turkey does not need the United States as it did in the past. While this statement might indeed be true, this would not mean that Turkey has been emancipated from Western and US strategies and policies in the Middle East. While Turkey has grown stronger by improving relations with most of its neighbours, it is not a global actor yet. It still needs to address the domestic and foreign policy issues Davutoglu has identified –at the minimum. While Turkey’s role in the Middle East will be a function of its own ability to balance its Western vocation with its Middle East agenda, it remains to be seen whether Greece develops its own active strategy, so its relations with key Middle Eastern states do not simply fill Turkey’s absences.

(Published in the October 2010 issue of Odyssey)

Turkey and Iran’s Nuclear Conundrum: Much Ado about Nothing?

Ushering in a new era in Turkish-Iranian relations has been a facet of an overall reorientation of Turkish foreign policy. Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) the Middle East has gained more weight and become a key region for Turkish diplomacy. This was in line with the new strategic doctrine introduced by Ahmet Davutoglu, the chief foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan who in May 2009 rose to the post of Foreign Minister.
According to Davutoglu’s vision, Turkey is a “central power” and possesses “strategic depth.”  This means that Turkey should no more shape its regional strategies and policies in accordance with the strategic priorities of its Western allies, most importantly the United States. On the contrary, it had to establish its own strategic agenda and priorities, which would not necessarily coincide with these of the United States or Europe. In Davutoglu’s view, Turkey had to dissociate itself from its established militaristic and firmly pro-Western image and foster a new image in which Turkey’s soft power, translated into economic, cultural and political clout would prevail. According to that view, Turkey should claim a leading intermediary role in all regional conflicts in the Middle East, resolve all pending bilateral disputes and build strategic cooperation with its neighbors. This allowed for a reconfiguration of Turkey’s relations with Iran, which should not be a function –or even hostage– of US- or European-Iranian relations. In a recent article, Davutoglu stated that


....our allies should take into consideration Turkey’s unique position. As a growing economy and surrounded by energy resources, Turkey needs Iranian energy as a natural extension of its national interests. Therefore, Turkey’s energy agreements with Iran cannot be dependent upon its relationships with other countries.

Turkey’s new Iran policy has comprised a clear attempt to achieve its emancipation from US Middle Eastern policy.  Ever since the rise of AKP into power in 2002, Turkey has increasingly taken distance from US strategies and policies in Iraq, Israel and other Middle Eastern states. It is also indicative that Davutoglu in his writings includes Iran to his privileged group of states which due to their history and geography have a “central power” status and enjoy “strategic depth.” Hence he prioritizes the development of strong Turkish-Iranian strategic relations. Iran and its energy resources are more important for Turkey than its Western allies might consider.
Energy has been an area where Turkish-Iranian cooperation has flourished. The cooperation, which had begun in the mid 1990s through the construction of a pipeline for the export of Iranian natural gas to Turkey has been consolidated and included Turkish investment in the Iranian natural gas upstream sector. According to a 2008 Memorandum of Understanding Turkey’s TPAO would participate in the development of South Pars, Iran’s largest offshore natural gas field. Bilateral trade reached 10 billion dollars in 2008, with the aim to reach 20 billion by 2013. Yet there was much more than mutual economic gains in Turkish-Iranian relations. A series of official visits highlighted the level of mutual understanding at the top level, and public opinion of both countries seemed to agree. During his official visit to Turkey in August 2007, Iran’s President Mahmud Ahmadinejad was cheered by Turkish citizens when he went to pray in the historic Sultanahmet mosque in Istanbul. This was all the more important given Iran’s increasing alienation at the international level. The Iranian nuclear program has caused fear and concern about the true intentions of the Iranian regime. Iran’s potential interest in developing nuclear weapons has worried not only the United States, Israel and Europe, but also Arab states, most notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
Many suspect religion to be one of the main reasons for the affinity between Ankara and Tehran. The AKP, Turkey’s government party since 2002 comes from the ranks of Turkish political Islam, and this was perceived to be sufficient reason for a close relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Religious affinity was indeed the reason why Turkey’s first Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan aimed to improve bilateral relations and signed the first natural gas deal with Iran in 1996. Nevertheless, it was rather pragmatism and not religion behind the determination of the AKP government to upgrade relations with Iran and claim a key role in its nuclear controversy. The Iranian nuclear crisis provided a golden opportunity –as well as a litmus test– for Foreign Minister Davutoglu to implement his vision about Turkey’s proactive foreign policy and autonomous strategic role. Distancing itself from the United States and the European Union, Turkey claimed a leading mediating role in the Iranian nuclear dispute. It has refused to side with Western pressure aiming to stop Iran’s uranium enrichment program, objected to the imposition of any sanctions against Tehran and defended Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. In accordance to this vision, Turkey has aimed to spearhead international mediation for a compromise solution. In his visit to Tehran in February 2010, Davutoglu attempted to broker a deal for the enrichment of uranium necessary for Iranian nuclear power plants under conditions which would preclude the possibility of developing nuclear weapon capabilities. Turkey’s interventions aimed further than minimizing the risk of developing nuclear fuel for Iranian power plants. In a speech in Washington DC in December 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan defended a nuclear-free Middle East and accused the Western states of double standards when dealing with issues of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. This was a skilful implication of Israel, a country which is not a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but is believed to possess nuclear weapons, in Iran’s nuclear controversy. Turkey attempted to reshape the agenda of nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle East in a way that did not only include Iran but also Israel.
This was not the first time Turkey attempted to antagonize Israel on a regional security issue. In his famous Davos duel with Israeli President Shimon Peres in January 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan chastised Israel’s policies in Gaza, winning strong applause throughout the Islamic world. Turkish-Israeli relations reached a lowmark on 31 May 2010, when nine Turkish activists were killed during clashes between a flotilla aiming to break the Israeli blockade and bring humanitarian aid to Gaza and Israeli security forces. This escalation seriously undermined an alliance which used to be one of the cornerstones of Turkey’s security policy and affected Turkey’s relations with the pro-Israel lobby in the United States. On the other hand, it allowed Turkey to claim a leadership role among the Islamic world. Erdogan voiced popular arguments throughout the Middle East regarding the Palestinian question and Iran’s nuclear program, namely that it would be unfair to demand from Iran to freeze its nuclear program, while Israel has faced no criticism for its violation of nuclear proliferation treaties and development of nuclear weapons. The popularity of Prime Minister Erdogan reached high peaks in the Islamic world. Nowadays, he may indeed be more popular in several Arab capitals than in Ankara.
While the Iranian nuclear crisis allows for the articulation of Turkey’s regional leadership and autonomous strategic planning ambitions, one begs the question whether it has had any real impact on the crisis itself. The jury is still out on this. Several experts point at the widening of diplomatic maneuvering space which Turkey’s diplomatic activism has secured. It would be hard to deny the significance of building dialogue and communication channels between the Iranian regime and the West, especially as far as the prevention of sanctions and further escalation are concerned. On the other hand, the deal which Turkey and Brazil clinched with Iran on 17 May 2010 bore little fruit, as far as the crux of the crisis is concerned. Failing to win Iran’s abolition of its domestic uranium enrichment program meant that the international community would not consider the agreement satisfactory. The 10 June 2010 decision of the UN Security Council to impose additional sanctions on Iran due to its nuclear program was a consequence of this and was made despite the dissenting votes of Turkey and Brazil. This had two lessons for Turkish diplomacy. First, to be an efficient mediator, Turkey needed to maintain close working relations with the West. Second, Iran did not perceive Turkey to be its sole intermediary with the West. In other words, Turkey’s role in the resolution of the Iranian nuclear question was not considered indispensable by Iran.
One also needs to add that Turkey’s Iran strategy entails considerable risk, as far as the regional implications from the potential rise of Iran as a nuclear power are concerned. In fact, Turkey would be one of the countries whose security could be worst impaired if Iran reneged on its commitments and developed its own nuclear weapons. Turkey might even have to join a nuclear arms race with other Middle Eastern states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt with the aim to counter Iran’s regional leadership claims. By trusting the good intentions of Iran’s leadership and overestimating its leverage over it, Turkey may be taking a big risk.
    To sum up, Turkey’s attempt to claim a mediating role between Iran and the West on Iran’s nuclear program has so far produced few tangible results. The problem persists, and no final solution has been achieved on the question of safely enriching Iran’s uranium for peaceful purposes. It has, however, underlined the emancipation of Turkey’s strategic planning and foreign policy, as well as its ambition for a leading role in the Middle East. Turkey’s regional interests have become too important to be compromised by US, European or Israeli concerns regarding Iran and its nuclear ambitions. The endgame of the Iranian nuclear conundrum will provide evidence on whether this reconfiguration was rational or a case of strategic overstretch.

Bibliography

Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu (İstanbul: Küre, 2005)
———, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, no. 1 (2008), pp. 77-96
International Crisis Group (ICG), Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints [Europe Report No 203] (Brussels, 2010)
Heinz Kramer, AKP's 'New' Foreign Policy between Vision and Pragmatism [Working Paper FG 2] (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2010)

(Published in Arabic in the magazine "Afaq-al-Mustaqbal" in September 2010)

Levantine Christianity and Greece: Ending an Era of Indifference

St. Thecla Church, Maalula, Syria

When one talks about the Middle East, Islam comes to mind. The identification of the region with one only of the monotheistic religions which were born in its territory is understandable given that the overwhelming majority of its population is Muslim and that since the launch of the “Clash of Civilizations” debate the Middle East has come to be understood as the quintessential Islamic part of the world. Yet this identification is inaccurate. The Middle East still hosts significant populations of Christians in several countries. And their role is nowhere more influential than in the Levant.
    It is impossible to visit Syria for example and not come across its strong Christian heritage.  Christians in Syria may be as much as 10 percent of the country’s population in a country of roughly 22 million. They are fragmented into numerous churches, which were the product of numerous political and dogmatic divisions, as well as the Crusades. The eastern part of the walled old city of Damascus is still dominated by its Christian communities. Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Gregorian, Armenian Catholic, Assyrian and Chaldean churches mark the skyline of the most touristic part of Damascus. The boroughs of Bab Tuma (Thomas Gate) and Bab Sharki (Eastern Gate) are completely different from the rest of the old city. Full of bars and cafes, they are frequented by the hundreds of Western students who visit Damascus to learn Arabic.
What makes Syrian –and other Levantine– Christians even more interesting from a Greek point of view, is that they maintain the name which used to characterise all the Orthodox of the Ottoman Empire. They are still officially called Rum, “Romioi” in other words, although their mother tongue is Arabic. While the term “Rum” was marginalised in the Balkans by terms such as “Greek”, “Bulgarian”, “Serbian” and “Romanian” as a result of the Enlightenment and the rise of several nationalistic movements, it was not effaced in the Middle East. The Levant is the only part of the post-Ottoman world where the word “Rum” retains its relevance as well as its complex religious-political significance. It is no accident that the political system of Lebanon remains based on the confessional divisions of the Lebanese people. This can also be seen in the old cities of Syria which maintain the confessional division of their neighbourhoods. What used to be the case throughout the Ottoman Empire, religious diversity and division of cities on religious and confessional grounds, survives today only in the Levant.
    It is also interesting to compare the historic paths of two similar communities. The Turkish-speaking Rum of Anatolia (Karamanli) and the Arabic-speaking Rum of the Levant maintained their religious identity, despite belonging to non-Greek linguistic groups. The former were early admitted as an indispensable part of the Greek “imagined community.” Throughout the nineteenth century major efforts were made with the aim to spread the Greek language and consolidate the Greek national identity of the Karamanlis. No such effort was made towards the direction of the Levant Rum. The involvement of European Great Powers in Levantine affairs and the focus of the Greek “Megali Idea” on the Balkans and the Ionian Coast of the Aegean meant that Greece would never invite the Arab-speaking Levant Rum to join the Greek national identity. On the one hand, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the clash of competing Greek and Turkish nationalisms and the population exchange agreement of 1923 gave the final answer to the question of the Karamanli identity. Karamanlis were en masse deported to Greece, because they were understood by the parties not only as Rum, but also as Greek.
On the other hand, Levantine Christian communities spearheaded another ideological movement which would shake the Middle East: pan-Arabism. Due to their close economic and cultural links with the West, they would also introduce nationalism and enlightenment ideas in the Levant. Two of the most influential leaders of the pan-Arabist movement, Michel Aflaq, the founder of the pan-Arabist Baath party and an emblematic figure of pan-Arabism, was a Rum from Syria and George Antonius, the author of the first nationalistic history of the Arabs was a Rum from Lebanon. Their Christian identity did not prevent them from wishing to instrumentalize Islam to form together with the Arabic language the cement of a united, strong Arab nation. While pan-Arabist dreams found their nemesis in the Arab-Israeli wars, and in particular in the 1967 “War of Six Days”, Levantine Christians maintain their disproportionate to their size influence in the intellectual life of their respective countries. Syria’s secular regime, Lebanon’s multi-confessional constitution and Jordan’s sensitive relationship with the West also guarantee that Levantine Christians are unlikely to face a drastic deterioration of their status in the near term. Yet the persistent Middle Eastern conflicts and demographic trends may indeed tilt the balance against Christians in the longer term. Thousands of Levantine Christians have emigrated from the region as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the wars in Lebanon.
So where is Greece in all this? Following the exclusion of all Levantine Christians from the Greek nation, Greece has failed to pursue a strategy of engagement with these communities. Limited contacts through the Damascus-based Patriarchate of Antioch have failed to deliver much. In some cases the involvement of religious NGOs such as the infamous “Solidarity” of the Church of Greece led to acrimony and disputes instead of promoting relations. This indifference is not unrelated to the overall marginalisation of the Middle East, as far as Greek strategic priorities were concerned. Greece was envisioned as a European and hence Balkan country and was willing to dispose of its Eastern Mediterranean identity which would make it an integral part of the Levant. While discussing these in times of financial crisis might be a bit of luxury, it is imperative that Greece reconsiders its strategy to include the Middle East as one of its key action areas. The Levantine Christians could help Greece reconnect with one of the most important regions in the world.

(Published in the August 2010 issue of Odyssey)

Could the Greek Crisis Turn into an Opportunity?

Greece has attracted in recent weeks a great deal of rather unwanted and unsavoury attention due to its ailing state finances. The EU Council Meeting of 11 February fell short of announcing a bailout package; it stressed, however, European support for the Greek governments’ fiscal austerity programme and underlined that European authorities would support Greece’s refinancing of sovereign debt, if necessary. European authorities have very good reasons to be concerned about the state of Greek finances. While Greek economy accounts for only a small fraction of the Eurozone economy, the ramifications of a Greek debt crisis would be dire for Europe’s single most important achievement, the Euro. On the other hand, moral hazard considerations are clearly legitimate. European authorities need to find a way to prevent the outbreak of a debt crisis which could spread to other European economies and even affect European banking, without being seen as rewarding fiscal irresponsibility and recklessness.

The resolution of Greece’s fiscal crisis would have been much easier, had the crisis been limited to the economy. Yet the crisis has systemic dimensions, touching upon the political and bureaucratic elites and the people itself. A clear example: Greek governments have admitted twice in the last six years that their statistical authorities provided Eurostat with false data which –temporarily– camouflaged the shortcomings of Greek economy. To make things worse, in both cases, this misinformation was not presented as negligence but rather as a deliberate act. To this, one needs to add the chronic inefficiency of Greece’s enormous public sector. When the current Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou pledges a drastic increase of tax revenues, one can only wonder how he can achieve this target with the existing tax-collecting bureaucracy.  In fact, the recent rise in the spread of the Greek bonds reflects distrust against Greek politicians and bureaucrats. Financial markets in other words are not convinced that even a government with the best intentions will be able to deliver the long-needed changes, if it faces strong opposition from the bureaucracy and the people itself.

The crisis has not left Greek society aloof, either. A society which has been used to living beyond its means for decades due to generous EU subsidies and heavy borrowing at Eurozone low interest rates needs now to face the consequences of decades of irresponsible economic policies. Greeks will have to undergo unpleasant, but long due economic reform to help boost state finances and restore the competitiveness of their economy. Undermining the wellbeing of future generations through reckless borrowing and spending can no more be a policy option. Moreover, it is imperative that the rule of law is restored in a society where anomy is often tolerated. It is hard for the government’s reform agenda to win credibility among creditors and EU partners, when a handful of farmers can ridicule the rule of law throughout the country. Adjusting to the new reality can be a painful process for many. Yet there is no other solution. The era of indulgence is over.

Paraphrasing a commonly quoted adage, Greece and the European Union cannot afford letting the current crisis go to waste. European Union needs to heal the structural imbalances and policy loopholes which became evident during the Greek crisis. In particular, the fragility of the single currency in the absence of an integrated fiscal policy has become evident and needs to be dealt with urgently. On the other hand, to cease being Europe’s “weak link,” Greece needs to put its house into order. This crisis brings exigency to the implementation of reforms which have been postponed for decades. This is a truly Herculean task for the Greek government. Cleaning the Augean stables was one of Hercules’ twelve labours. Prime Minister George Papandreou needs not only to clean, but also to rebuild his own.

(Published on ELIAMEP Blogs on 12 February 2010) 

Interview

Turkish Political Culture Liberalizing, Greek Scholar says

By Reeta Paakinen

Turkey’s accession process to the European Union has made the country’s political culture in recent years more liberal than ever before, according to a Greek academic of Turkish politics.

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis is currently assistant professor of political science at Ankara’s Bilkent University although his résumé also includes positions at Athens University and Istanbul’s Işık and Sabancı universities. His book “Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union” was released in Istanbul on Wednesday. The book is based on Grigoriadis’ Ph.D. work at London’s School of Oriental and African Studies, or SOAS, where he conducted research under Professor William Hale.

“Trials of Europeanization” assesses the impact of improving EU-Turkey relations on Turkish political culture and tries to identify progress in domains of national identity, secularism, civil society and state-society relations. It focuses on the past 10 years, starting from the so-called Helsinki Decision in December 1999, when Turkey was declared a candidate for EU membership.

“There is an increasing liberalization of Turkish political culture, an opening of discourse on issues that were taboos in the past. Several issues are being openly discussed, including national identity and secularism; this is very important,” Grigoriadis told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review in an interview.

Since 1999, Turkish civil society has become more active with citizens participating in politics in a much more open manner than in the past, he said.

“There are still some challenges to be dealt with, but progress has taken place. I am not saying things are good in many respects, but things are better. I can identify some changes [in Turkish political culture], which I would consider irreversible [for the most part],” Grigoriadis said.

One of the changes is the evolving discourse on secularism, Grigoriadis said. The book presents two versions of secularism: an assertive one and a passive one. “The polarization of Turkish political culture [in recent years] has led to a debate about liberalizing Turkish secularism as well. This is something new,” he said.

He believes finding a consensus on the headscarf debate is possible. “A consensus can be reached whereby no secular women may be forced to wear a headscarf, while no pious women may be forced to take it off either. This is the key point,” he said.

More work on minority rights needed

In his book, Grigoriadis identifies these positive developments, but also highlights shortcomings such as minority rights. “This is an area in which little progress has been achieved and much remains to be done,” he said.

“A big part of this agenda is linked to the Kurdish initiative although we do not know exactly how far it will go and how openly it will address issues that relate to the Kurds in this country,” Grigoriadis said. “However, Alevi issues are still on the table and non-Muslim rights are also very prominent.”

“In fact, as Istanbul will become the European Capital of Culture next year it will be very important to give evidence of the respect for the multicultural and multi-religious heritage of the city by resolving these issues sooner rather than later.”

Privileged partnership talk erodes credibility

The scholar criticized France and Germany for its “privileged partnership’” rhetoric, something he said erodes the EU’s credibility in regions neighboring Turkey. “Turkey needs to do its homework but the EU should give clear signals that Turkey has a fair chance of becoming a member if it complies with the Copenhagen criteria,” Grigoriadis said. “The statements of France and Germany, to a lesser extent, do a lot of harm to the Turkish democratization process.”

Cyprus a key priority

Despite his focus on Turkish political culture, Grigoriadis’ also said the Cyprus issue should be one of the key priorities of EU foreign policy because of the veto power of Greek Cyprus. Another reason why the issue should be resolved is that some EU member states may use Cyprus as an excuse in opposing Turkey’s EU accession for completely different reasons.

“It will always create problems for Turkey’s accession process. Not least because other countries might be willing to play with this problem in order not to expose themselves for other opinions they may hold about Turkish EU accession. I would point to the Cyprus issue as the number one priority in the foreign policy agenda in the EU,” Grigoriadis said.

In his view, the failure of the Kofi Annan Peace Plan in 2004 was particularly unfortunate. “When the decision was made about the membership of Cyprus in the EU, the Greek Cypriot side argued that if they were kept outside the union because of the lack of solution for which the Turkish Cypriots were responsible, Greek Cypriots would become hostages,” he said.

“At that time, this argument appeared to be convincing as the Greek Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides was the motivator for a solution while [Turkish Cypriot President] Rauf Denktaş was the intransigent one,” Grigoriadis said.

Soon, matters took a different turn, Grigoriadis said. “There was a 180 degree turn because a moderate Turkish Cypriot leader and a more intransigent Greek Cypriot leader [came into the picture]. Most European countries were not happy with the end result of the Cyprus accession without the solution. It did give signals on the Greek Cypriot side whether they can go on with an unresolved problem for indefinite amount of time,” he said.

On the other hand, there were some “legitimate concerns” about some aspects of the Annan Peace Plan, Grigoriadis said. “These were, for instance the guarantor questions or the presence of the military on both sides. They could have been resolved without a major loss for the Turkish Cypriot side.”

Upcoming publications

Grigoriadis’ upcoming work will include a comparative piece on U.S-Turkey relations and anti-Americanism in Turkey, which will appear in the Middle East Journal in January 2010. In September, Grigoriadis’ article on the role of the Church of Greece in Greek-Turkish relations was published in “Religion and Politics in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa” (Routledge 2009).

He is currently doing research on center-left parties in Greece and Turkey together with Ziya Öniş, professor of international relations at Koç University. “I am trying to compare how the center-left parties in Greece and Turkey have evolved since the 1970s. While the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, and the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement, or PASOK, were quite similar in the 1970s, they have since taken a completely different path,” he said.

Evolving neighborly relations

The earthquakes in the fall of 1999 in Turkey and Greece marked the start of a new era in contacts at the grassroots level between the two nations.

Greek scholar Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, however, says the right crew of diplomats was already in place for reconciliation to occur.

“In a sense, the earthquakes of 1999 were a tipping point [in Greek-Turkish relations]. The right people – George Papandreou and Ismail Cem – were in the foreign ministries of both countries already,” Grigoriadis said. “However, they still needed an event that could mobilize popular opinion, which was very negative on both sides. The opening the earthquake created was exploited by some forward-looking, visionary politicians on both sides to [get us to] where we are right now.”

Ten years on, there is growing interest in Greece toward Turkey.

“There is a major trend that is also supported by improving economic conditions. People want to learn the language, come here and spend time living in Istanbul and other parts of Turkey, trying to obtain as objective a view of the country as possible,” Grigoriadis said.

The scholar believes there is increasing interest in Greece in the Turkish language too. “People think learning Turkish is a good asset for their career as well,” he said.

Although grassroots contacts between the citizens of Greece and Turkey are stronger than before, there is still a need for high-level political moves, Grigoriadis said.

“Economic relations have become stronger and trade between the two countries has skyrocketed in recent years. Relations at the civil-society level are stronger and there is a lot of interaction and travel between the two countries. The youth in particular are getting to know each other,” he said. “But on the high politics side, things haven’t improved much.”

The strengthening of bilateral relations started slowing down a few years ago. “There was a big opportunity that was lost in 2004 for the resolution of the Cyprus issue,” Grigoriadis said. “Ever since then, issues on the bilateral level, such as the Aegean dispute, have not been resolved.”

“There is a need for a strong political will on both sides,” he said. “But because of populist pressures and changing public opinion, it is important for the political will to be simultaneous in Greece and Turkey.”

(Published on Hürriyet Daily News on 20 November 2009)

Touching upon Turkey’s Taboos: Minorities in Past and Present

Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is known for his spontaneous and unpredictable character. In several occasions, he has behaved in ways which have surprised even his closest advisors. The recent “Davos crisis” with Israel is the prime example of this. On 23 May, Erdogan relapsed. He succeeded in stirring domestic and international attention with an unexpected statement touching upon one of Turkey’s most sensitive and taboo issues: its record of minority treatment.

All started when the government announced its plans to clear large minefields on Turkey’s borders in accordance with the country’s international obligations. Unlike what one would expect, it wouldn’t be the Turkish military but foreign private companies which would undertake this task. In fact, the tender for the clearing of the vast minefield along the Turkish-Syrian border would be awarded to an Israeli company. Few doubted that the Israeli company would be best suited to deliver the task at the most competitive price. However, the discussion focused immediately on Turkey’s national security. How could foreign companies gain access to sensitive information like the location of minefields? How could this compromise Turkish sovereignty? How could an Israeli company be positioned on the border with Israel’s archenemy Syria?

Erdogan responded to that criticism In a Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi- AKP) party meeting in Duzce, a small town slightly east of the Istanbul-Ankara highway in the following words:

Some said that “Turkey is lost to foreigners” because some of the foreign entrepreneurs who invest here belong to a different religion. Is it so easy? They did such things in this country for years. Those who had different ethnic identities were chased from this country. Have we won from this? We need to think about this. However, this has never been thought about. In fact, this was the result of a fascist-leaning approach. Occasionally we also made the same mistakes.

This statement caused shock and further reaction in the ranks of Turkish opposition. Erdogan was accused of vilifying Turkey and vindicating long-standing Greek, Armenian and Jewish claims about the discriminatory policies of the Turkish Republic. They also pointed at the positive response of Greek, Armenian and Jewish media to the unexpected statement. The leader of the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi-MHP) Devlet Bahceli was the most virulent of all. He argued that Erdogan’s statement was evidence of psychological imbalance and added that it was a great and indelible shame for Turkey that the Prime Minister “took sides together with the Greeks and the Armenians.”

What were the events which Erdogan referred to as evidence of a “fascist-leaning approach?” One could indicatively list here in chronological order the anti-Jewish events and the Settlement Law (Iskan Kanunu) of 1934, the 1942 Property Tax (Varlik Vergisi) which severely hit Istanbul’s Greeks, Armenians and Jews, the 1955 6-7 September events which again hit the Greek minority and the 1964 deportations of Istanbul Greeks who had dual or Greek nationality. The common thread behind all these events was a perception of Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities as “non-assimilable.” Unlike the Kurds, the Arabs, the Laz, the Circassians and the other Muslim ethnic groups who were given a chance to enjoy full citizenship rights by voluntarily assimilating to the republican Turkish national identity, Turkey’s non-Muslims were viewed as essentially different and therefore unsuitable for assimilation. Given that the presence of any minority was seen as a severe compromise of national sovereignty and a potential threat for territorial integrity, a panoply of discriminatory and oppressive measures was employed with the aim to increase pressure and eventually lead to their marginalisation and numerical decimation through emigration.

The reaction to Erdogan’s statement shows that this mentality is still quite strong. Yet it is no more “the only game in town.” Increasing interest in Turkey’s multiethnic, multi-religious past has been manifested in Turkey’s recent literary and cinematographic production. Movies like Yesim Ustaoglu’s “Bulutlari Beklerken,” which dealt with the deportations of Pontic Greeks, Tomris Giritlioglu’s “Salkım Hanım'ın Taneleri” which focused on the 1942 Property Tax and Giritlioglu’s most recent “Guz Sancisi” dealing with the September 1955 events, highlighted the emergence of a new, critical look upon some of the most traumatic pages of recent Turkish history. The very issue which Erdogan raised, the loss which anti-minority policies entailed for Turkey’s economy, society and identity, is one of the main features of these works.

On the other hand, it should be noted that discriminatory policies are still largely in place. The legal obstacles which non-Muslim pious foundations still find in their operation, the lack of any serious progress regarding their restitution to their confiscated properties over the decades, the serious problems which the Ecumenical Patriarchate still faces in its operation, not least of which is the closure of the Halki Seminary provide evidence that this mentality still appears to be a defining principle of Turkish national interest for the Turkish state.

One could reasonably react here: How could Turkey’s Prime Minister take distance and severely criticise the policies of a state he has been leading for almost seven years? This paradox can only be understood in the context of Turkish political history. Erdogan represents a party with roots in the periphery of Turkish politics and society which was until 2002 excluded from any access to political and bureaucratic power. This remained the privilege of Turkey’s republican elite, which undertook the task to consolidate the reform of Kemal Ataturk and complete the process of Turkish nation-building through assimilation and discrimination. Despite the fact that the AKP has been in power since 2002, this elite has maintained considerable power, as the closure case against the AKP manifested last year. The fact that Erdogan touched such a taboo issue by using so harsh words showed that he did not hold his party or his voters accountable for the past wrong-doings of the bureaucratic elite. On the contrary, his business pragmatism allowed him to see the mutual benefits of economic cooperation with foreign companies and question the wisdom of policies which deprived Istanbul of its most vibrant economic elite. Would this statement mean that a real change in discriminatory policies against Turkey’s minorities may be imminent? One cannot tell for sure. Erdogan’s past statements have not always guaranteed future actions. Unpredictability can work both ways....

(Published on ELIAMEP Blogs on 25 June 2009)